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As shelter-in-place and lockdown orders were enforced around the world, Zoom meetings replaced classrooms, offices, gaming lobbies and even concert halls. Throughout the month of March alone, over 200 million people used the conferencing platform, compared to the previous monthly maximum of 10 million.[@bib2]

An investigation carried out by the *New York Times* in April has revealed that a considerable number of social media accounts, including Instagram accounts, Twitter accounts, message boards on Reddit and 4Chan, are used by thousands of people to carry out Zoom disruption campaigns.[@bib3] The people in question create plans and share meeting passwords that they use to join public and private meetings.

Experts report that 500,000 Zoom accounts are usually being sold on the dark web and hacker forums. Some of those accounts have been broken into using information from older data breaches, known as credential-stuffing attacks.[@bib4] Many users use the same password (or a limited set of passwords) across all accounts that they use on the Internet. Therefore, once an account is compromised in one place, it is highly likely that there will be accounts made by the same user that can be accessed on other platforms, using the same set of credentials.

Encryption claims {#cesec10}
=================

While stuffing attacks contributed to a certain extent, an even more critical security issue led to many Zoom accounts being compromised. Zoom claims to use end-to-end encryption.[@bib5] This method is considered to be one of the most secure ways to communicate information online. It uses cryptographic keys to encrypt and decrypt data. Encryption and decryption happen at both ends of the connection, preventing anyone in the middle -- including the platform itself -- from accessing the information. Both the sender and the receiver have a private key, accessible only to each one of them, and a public key which is freely available. Each user\'s public and private keys are mathematically related. Therefore, the sender uses the receiver\'s public key to encrypt the message into ciphertext. Only the receiver can decrypt the message back to plain text, since no one else has the receiver\'s private key.

But a blog post released by Zoom in April 2020 shows that the company\'s end-to-end encryption architecture does not conform with the standard industry definition for this kind of encryption. Instead it describes the application of Transport Security Layer (TLS) encryption to the data transfer that happens between users and the Zoom servers, as seen in [Figure 1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"} .Figure 1Zoom\'s implementation of 'end-to-end' encryption. Rather than having secure connection directly between clients, the connections are routed through the company\'s servers, allowing for server-side decryption.

Theoretically this allows the company to access data from its users, using server-side decryption. Moreover, some of the calls on the Zoom platform, and the keys for specific conferences, are actually routed through China. This was discovered in a study carried out by The Citizen Lab, which shows that a call between two users, one in Canada and the other in the US, was routed through a server located in Beijing.[@bib6]

Despite the fact that Zoom is headquartered in San Jose, the Zoom platform is developed by three companies based in China, which employ more than 700 people, as seen in the latest SEC filing from the company.[@bib7] Since a large portion of the engineers are located in China, Scott Stewart, VP of Stratfor\'s Threat Lens, has previously stated that the company\'s failure to use end-to-end encryption can allow an employee to be pressured by the Chinese authorities into accessing and sharing private meetings carried over the video conferencing platform.[@bib8]

This is a critical issue since it is not the first time Zoom has shared users' information without their authorisation. An analysis carried out by Motherboard showed that user analytics, collected on Zoom\'s iOS mobile application, are transferred to Facebook.[@bib9] A connection to the Facebook Graph API was created whenever the app was accessed, as shown by network logs stored on iOS devices. While the transferring of data to Facebook was swiftly removed, Zoom could still be using server-side decryption to process and transfer user information to unauthorised third parties.

Architectural issues {#cesec20}
====================

An even larger issue that the video conferencing platform faces lies in the architecture that it uses. The transport protocol is a derivation of the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) standard. The derivation adds an extra custom encryption layer on top of the RTP standard. As published in a study by CitizenLab, a Zoom meeting is encrypted using a single AES-128 key, generated on the server side and shared with all the clients.

This key is encrypted in Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode, which is one of the simplest forms of encryption and is semantically insecure. Merely analysing ciphertext encrypted using ECB can reveal information about the original text. This is because ECB encrypts blocks of data of the same fixed byte size using the same exact key. Hence, if the information to be encrypted is not smaller than a single block of data -- which is very rare since the block sizes used are commonly 64 or 128 bits -- the ciphertext will have very similar patterns to the original data. In Zoom\'s case, the main pieces of data to be communicated are the users' video streams. [Figure 2](#fig2){ref-type="fig"} clearly shows that the outline and patterns of the original image are easily observed in its ECB-encrypted version, compared to the same original image being encrypted using AES-128 in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode.[@bib10] Figure 2The left-most image is an original unencrypted picture of a penguin. The middle image represents the ECB-encrypted version of the original image. The right-most image is the encrypted version of the original picture, using AES-128 in CBC mode.

Using AES-128 in ECB mode is subpar to industry standards, as even Eric Yuan, the CEO of Zoom, has admitted.[@bib11] Many companies use AES-128 encryption in CBC mode. The main flaw of ECB is that each identical block of data will result in the same piece of cipher text. Therefore, CBC addresses this issue by making sure that the resulting cipher always changes. CBC initially creates an initialisation vector, a fixed-size random input, which is then passed through an XOR gate together with the first block of plain data. The result is then encrypted. The next block of plain data is then passed through the XOR gate together with the result from the previous block and the result is encrypted. This process continues until all the blocks of data are encrypted.[@bib12] The initialisation vector is also changed for every new message, making patterns even more difficult to find in the encrypted cipher. Decryption is relatively straightforward -- the process above is done in reverse.

AES variants {#cesec30}
============

There are three variations of AES encryption -- AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256. The only difference between them is the number of encryption rounds. AES-128 uses 10 rounds, AES-192 uses 12 rounds and AES-256 uses 14 rounds.[@bib13] The more rounds of encryption that data goes through, the harder it becomes to break. A CIA report on cyber security strongly encouraged the use of AES-256 encryption, rather than AES-128, which seems to be the current industry standard.[@bib14]

The CIA report mentions that AES-256 and end-to-end encryption, when used together in an appropriate manner, represent one of the most secure ways of encrypting and transferring data. The report also states that the encryption keys should not be left out in the open and readily available, but should be stored in a secure place that makes it hard for hackers to access.[@bib15] Those are all practices that Zoom does not implement.

"While Zoom has improved its security, we need end-to-end encryption to talk with our friends and loved ones without second-guessing everything we say, and worrying that someone else may be listening," said Albert Fox Cahn, executive director of the Surveillance and Technology Oversight Project.[@bib16] "Encryption has always been indispensable to secure communication, but today it\'s more crucial than ever."

Still being used {#cesec40}
================

Despite all these security threats and the FBI stating that hackers could exploit these weaknesses to "steal sensitive information, target individuals and businesses performing financial transactions, and engage in extortion", Zoom is still used by millions of people, including high-ranking government officials. While Zoom can be used in browsers, a large portion of its user base downloads and uses the desktop application. This can pose a major security threat to the user\'s computer and, as seen before, issues did happen with the Zoom desktop application around nine months ago.

A simplified model of the AES cryptography process.Source: ProPrivacy.

The Zoom desktop application runs in the background on the user\'s computer and listens to a specific port. Hence, when a user clicks to join a meeting in the browser, the desktop application is swiftly started -- a request is sent to the port that the Zoom application listens on. When it receives the request, the application boots itself up. The issue, now fixed, was that the Zoom application accepted requests from any web or local source. This allowed hackers to create denial of service (DoS) attacks on a user\'s computer by repeatedly sending requests to the port that the application is listening to. In turn, this would constantly boot up the application, stealing the user\'s 'focus' and making the computer almost unusable, unless the Internet connection was lost.[@bib17]

Another security threat was posed by the fact that the Zoom application could automatically re-download itself after the user uninstalled it. Having an application be able to download updates can be strictly controlled through policies and secure update channels, but having an open port that can be used to download complete software to a user\'s computer can allow hackers to silently download malware and viruses. This would most certainly compromise the user\'s computer.

Those issues were fixed several months ago -- for people who have installed the patches and updates -- but the possibility of new security vulnerabilities arising in the future is still there. Joseph Steinberg, a cyber security expert, has emphasised this by stating that: "If there are vulnerabilities, the \[Zoom\] app can jeopardise the security of data on the computer on which it is installed, or even potentially on other computers on the same network. Such vulnerabilities have been discovered -- and more may exist."[@bib18]

Serious threats {#cesec50}
===============

The lack of use of security industry standards in Zoom\'s video conferencing platform creates serious security threats to its users' information and meeting confidentiality. However, there are signs that the company is trying to mitigate these issues and it has released a 90-day plan to address them.

To strengthen its security and privacy capabilities, Zoom has acquired Keybase, which developed a secure end-to-end messaging and file-sharing service.[@bib19] It appears that the company is moving towards the industry standard of end-to-end encryption. Developing an end-to-end encryption system would prevent server-side decryption threats, meaning that the chance of having the company itself access confidential user information is significantly reduced.

In a recent blog post, Zoom also announced that as part of its 90-day plan, it will start supporting AES-256 encryption in Galois Counter Mode (GCM). GCM has similar capabilities as CBC, described above, and in many ways they produce the same performance. However, the two encryption modes work differently internally. GCM creates a counter and then sends it through the block cipher. The output from the block cipher is then passed through an XOR gate, together with the plain text, to form ciphertext.[@bib20] This major security change has been implemented in Zoom 5.0 and will slowly be rolled out to the company\'s entire user base. Using AES-256 GCM encryption would significantly increase Zoom\'s security and would prevent cases, such as the example presented in [Figure 1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"}, from occurring.

This shows that Zoom is learning from its previous mistakes and security flaws and is actively taking steps to improve on them. While those steps will bring the videoconferencing platform up to date with industry standards, it clearly shows that certain companies focus more on the functionality they provide to their users than they do on the appropriate security. However, as working from home has made a large population of the world become massively dependent on the use of the Internet to carry out its day-to-day work activities, the security, integrity and confidentiality of information is becoming increasingly important.

Resources {#cesec60}
=========
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